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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
Thomas M. Winn, III*
Lindsey H. Dobbs **
I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses six principal areas of state labor and em-
ployment law in which there was significant activity in Virginia's
state and federal courts over the past two years: (1) employment-
at-will;' (2) wrongful discharge;2 (3) employment agreements; 3 (4)
non-competition and non-solicitation agreements and fiduciary
duty;4 (5) respondeat superior and negligence in hiring, supervi-
sion, and retention;5 and (6) unemployment benefits.6 In addition,
this article summarizes some of the significant legislative enact-
ments affecting the employer/employee relationship.7 Beyond the
scope of this article are decisions rendered in other areas of law
affecting the employment relationship, including, inter alia, pub-
lic employment claims and workers' compensation claims.
II. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
As the Supreme Court of Virginia has repeatedly held, "Vir-
ginia adheres to the common law rule that when the intended du-
ration of a contract for the rendition of services cannot be deter-
mined by fair inference from the terms of the contract, then
* Principal, Woods Rogers, P.L.C., Roanoke, Virginia. A.B., 1990, Duke University;
J.D., 1993, University of Richmond School of Law, cum laude.
** B.A., 2002, University of Virginia; Candidate, J.D., 2005, University of Richmond
School of Law.
1. See discussion infra Part II.
2. See discussion infra Part III.
3. See discussion infra Part IV.
4. See discussion infra Part V.
5. See discussion infra Part VI.
6. See discussion infra Part VII.
7. See discussion infra Part VIII.
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either party is ordinarily at liberty to terminate the contract at
will. . . ."' Under the at-will doctrine, there is a presumption that
the employment relationship is terminable by either party, with
or without cause, for any reason. 9
As evinced by the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion in Cave
Hill Corp. v. Hiers, ° the court has no intention of departing from
the at-will presumption. In that case, the court began its analysis
of a breach of employment contract claim with familiar language.
"In Virginia, an employment relationship is presumed to be at-will,
which means that the employment term extends for an indefinite pe-
riod and may be terminated by the employer or employee for any
reason upon reasonable notice." However, when the employment is
for a definite period, the presumption of at-will employment is rebut-
ted and an employee may be terminated only for just cause. 1
1
Employing this presumption, even though there was an employ-
ment contract, the court found the employee relationship to be at-
will and entered final judgment in favor of the defendant em-
ployer.' 2
In Moore v. Historic Jackson Ward Ass'n, " the plaintiff brought
suit for wrongful termination in reliance upon the defendant em-
ployer's Personnel Policies and Procedures. 4 This document
listed reasons an employee may have been discharged for cause,
as opposed to listing reasons an employee should only have been
discharged for cause. 5 The Richmond City Circuit Court deter-
mined that the plaintiffs' claims were indistinguishable from the
fact pattern in County of Giles v. Wines. 6 In Wines, the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that a similar personnel policy, which
stated reasons an employee may have been discharged, was insuf-
8. Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 97, 465 S.E.2d 806, 808
(1996) (quoting Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 98, 102, 439 S.E.2d
328, 330 (1994)).
9. Hoffman Specialty Co. v. Pelouze, 158 Va. 586, 594, 164 S.E. 397, 399 (1932); see
also Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 535, 331 S.E.2d 797, 798 (1985).
10. 264 Va. 640, 570 S.E.2d 790 (2002). For a more complete discussion of the case,
see infra Part IV.
11. Id. at 645, 570 S.E.2d at 793 (quoting County of Giles v. Wines, 262 Va. 68, 72,
546 S.E.2d 721, 723 (2001)).
12. Id. at 646-47, 570 S.E.2d at 793-94.
13. 61 Va. Cir. 149 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Richmond City).
14. Id. at 150.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 149 (citing Wines, 262 Va. at 63, 546 S.E.2d at 721).
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ficient to rebut the strong presumption of employment-at-will. 17
Therefore, applying Wines as precedent, the Richmond City Cir-
cuit Court held that the plaintiff had not stated a cause of ac-
tion.
18
III. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
At-will employees typically have no avenues for relief from the
discharge decision per se.19 A number of exceptions to this princi-
ple, however, have evolved over time.
A. The "Public Policy" Exception
Virginia, like a number of other states,2" recognizes the public
policy exception2' to the employment-at-will doctrine.22 This prin-
ciple allows at-will employees to pursue a wrongful discharge
claim if they can identify a public policy that was violated in con-
nection with their discharge.23
In Swain v. Adventa Hospice, Inc.,24 an employee brought suit
in federal court for wrongful discharge, attempting to make use of
17. Wines, 262 Va. at 73, 546 S.E.2d at 723; see also Thomas M. Winn, III, Annual
Survey of Virginia Law: Labor and Employment Law, 37 U. RICH. L. REv. 241, 245-49
(2002) (analyzing the holding of the Wines case).
18. Moore, 61 Va. Cir. at 150.
19. See, e.g., Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 98-99, 465
S.E.2d 806, 809 (1996); cf. Wright v. St. Charles Water Auth., 59 Va. Cir. 244, 245 (Cir. Ct.
2002) (Lee County) (finding "that the Virginians with Disabilities Act (VDA) is the exclu-
sive state remedy for employment discrimination; thus, there is no common law wrongful
discharge claim").
20. See, e.g., Garner v. Rentenbach Constructers, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 438, 440 (N.C. 1999)
(citing Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (N.C. 1989)); Miller v. Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 455 S.E.2d 799, 802 (W. Va. 1995) (citing Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 248
S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978)).
21. For a comprehensive overview of the evolution of wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy claims, see Thomas R. Bagby & Thomas M. Winn, III, Connor v. National
Pest Control Association: The Death Knell for Public Policy Discriminatory Discharge
Claims?, 11 J. CIV. LITIG. 149, 150-56 (1999); Thomas M. Winn, III, Annual Survey of Vir-
ginia Law: Employment Law, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 965, 966-86 (1999); Thomas M. Winn,
III, The Supreme Court of Virginia Opens the Back Door for Public Policy Discriminatory
Discharge Claims, 12 J. CIV. LITIG. 1, 1-10 (2000).
22. See, e.g., Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 539-40, 331 S.E.2d 797,
800-01 (1985).
23. Id.
24. No. 7:03CV00505, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22753 (W.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2003) (mem.).
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one of the Supreme Court of Virginia's narrow exceptions to the
at-will doctrine.25 The employee, Swain, worked as a registered
nurse.26 While overseeing a patient whose death was purportedly
imminent, Swain noticed that the patient was over-medicated
and reduced the dosage. 21 Upon reduction of the dosage, the pa-
tient's health improved dramatically. 28 Addressing this conduct,
Swain's supervisor later explained that she should not have re-
duced the dosage and that in doing so she had embarrassed her
employer.29 The employer fired Swain the following day, citing re-
ceipt of adverse reports about her."°
Swain sought to recover for wrongful discharge under the pub-
lic policy exception expressed in Mitchem v. Counts,3' wherein the
Supreme Court of Virginia announced an exception to the at-will
doctrine for discharge based on the employee's refusal to engage
in a criminal act.32 Here, though Swain claimed manslaughter
would have ensued absent her intervention, she failed to allege
any refusal on her behalf of an order to perform an illegal act. 3
The federal court sitting in diversity noted that to recognize
Swain's claim "would substantially erode Virginia's employment
at-will doctrine,"34 and thus declined to do so." Granting the em-
ployer's motion to dismiss, the court explained, "[tihe refusal to
perform an unlawful act element-an element the court finds
lacking here-serves as a benchmark preventing this exception
from swallowing the employment at-will doctrine, and nowhere is
that fact any more apparent than when safety or health intersect
decision-making."36
25. Id. at *2.
26. Id. at *1.
27. Id. at *2.
28. Id.
29. Id. at *2-3.
30. Id at *3.
31. 259 Va. 179, 523 S.E.2d 246 (2000).
32. Swain, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22753 at *5-8 (citing Mitchem, 259 Va. at 190, 523
S.E.2d at 252).
33. Id. at *3, 8.
34. Id. at *7.
35. Id. at *8.
36. Id. at *6.
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B. No Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in At-
Will Employment
The Lee County Circuit Court considered a terminated em-
ployee's claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in Wright v. St. Charles Water Authority." The plain-
tiff claimed that his termination resulted "solely because of his
disabilities, which include[d] diabetes, high blood pressure, and a
'nervous condition."'38 The court dismissed the claim, affirming
prior Virginia holdings that "[a] covenant of.good faith and fair
dealing will not be implied as a part of an at-will employment
contract where the employer as well as the employee are at lib-
erty to terminate the contract."39
C. Constructive Discharge
In Padilla v. Silver Diner,4" the plaintiffs brought suit alleging,
inter alia, wrongful constructive discharge.4' "The theory of con-
structive discharge," the court noted, "is an extension of the tort
action for wrongful discharge and is available to an employee who
resigns as opposed to being fired."4 Though the court had refused
to acknowledge such a claim in the past, it chose to do so here,
noting that as of late "Virginia trial courts have recognized con-
structive discharge as a cause of action."43 The elements of this
action are as follows: "To establish constructive discharge, a
plaintiff must show that the termination was in violation of 'clear
and unequivocal public policy of this Commonwealth, that no per-
son should have to suffer such indignities,' and that the em-
ployer's actions were deliberate and created intolerable working
conditions."' As the plaintiffs in Silver Diner alleged sufficient
37. 59 Va. Cir. 244 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Lee County).
38. Id. at 244.
39. Id. at 246 (citing Schryer v. VBR, 25 Va. Cir. 464, 467 (Cir. Ct. 1991) (Fairfax
County)); see also Derthick v. Basset-Walker, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 510, 522 (W.D. Va. 1995).
40. 63 Va. Cir. 50 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Virginia Beach City).
41. Id. at 51-52.
42. Id. at 57 (citing Jones v. Prof. Hospitality Resources, Inc., 35 Va. Cir. 458 (Cir. Ct.
1995) (Virginia Beach City)).
43. Id. (citing Gochenour v. Beasley, 47 Va. Cir. 218 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Rockingham
County)).
44. Id.
20041
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facts to comport with these elements, the court overruled the de-
fendants' demurrer.45
IV. EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS
A. Breach of Contract
In Cave Hill Corp. v. Hiers,46 the Supreme Court of Virginia
analyzed a breach of contract claim brought by an employee
against his former employer.4 ' The employment contract specified
"Effective Dates [of] August 14, 1998-August 1, 2003" and pro-
vided that "[tlhirty (30) days' notice [would] be given by both the
employee and the employer in the case of leave or dismissal."48
Following discharge in May of 1999, the employee, Hiers, brought
suit alleging: (1) he was improperly denied certain commissions;
(2) his job performance was unjustly criticized; (3) he was guaran-
teed a fixed term of employment per the contract's effective date;
and (4) his termination was "without just cause."49 The employer,
Cave Hill, conversely, claimed that Hiers's employment was at-
will.5" In order to resolve what the trial court deemed ambiguity
in the contractual language, the jury was allowed to interpret the
employment contract and ultimately returned a verdict in favor of
Hiers in the amount of $260,000. 5'
Applying the above-mentioned and settled principles of the
employment-at-will doctrine, the supreme court noted that "when
45. Id. In overruling the defendants' demurrer, the court held,
[T]he first element is satisfied by the Plaintiffs' allegations that their contin-
ued employment was contingent upon their involvement in acts that violate
public policies set forth in Va. Code section 18.2-344, prohibiting fornication,
and Va. Code section 18.2-345, prohibiting lewd and lascivious cohabitation.
Additionally, the frequency and extent of Miller's alleged actions support an
inference of deliberateness and intolerable working conditions, notwithstand-
ing the defendants' assertion that the sole purpose of Miller's actions was for
the Plaintiffs to succumb to their sexual advances.
Id.
46. 264 Va. 640, 570 S.E.2d 790 (2002).
47. Id. at 642, 570 S.E.2d at 791.
48. Id. at 643, 570 S.E.2d at 791-92.
49. Id. at 644, 570 S.E.2d at 792.
50. See id. at 645, 570 S.E.2d at 793.
51. Id. at 644, 570 S.E.2d at 792-93. Upon Cave Hill's motion to set aside the verdict,
however, the court ordered remittitur to $100,000. Id.
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there is a conflict in the evidence concerning the terms of an em-
ployment contract, the question whether the employment is at
will or for a definite term becomes one of fact to be resolved by the
jury."52 Contractual language is ambiguous if it admits of more
than one understanding of the same thing. 3 Ambiguity is not
present "'merely because the parties or their attorneys disagree
upon the meaning of the language employed to express the agree-
ment.'5 4 Reversing the trial court and entering judgment in favor
of defendant Cave Hill, the supreme court held:
[Tihe contract was clear and unambiguous. In plain terms, the con-
tract was effective for a designated period of time. Nevertheless, the
agreement specifically was subject to certain "conditions," .... The
significant condition relevant here is that either party could termi-
nate the contract upon 30 days notice, according to the clear terms of
paragraph 5. This notice provision trumped the effect of the desig-
nated time period.
Nowhere in this writing is there any reference to a "just cause"
requirement for job termination by the employer. In order to find
such a requirement, one would have to insert words into the writing
contrary to the elementary rule that the function of the court is to
construe the contract made by the parties, not to make a contract for
them.
55
In Mills v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University,56
Mills, an employee of Virginia Tech, brought a claim for breach of
contract. Tech transferred Mills, a radio station manager, from
his position in Roanoke to one in Blacksburg. 5' As a result of a
dispute over the relocation, Mills failed to report to his new posi-
tion in Blacksburg for over a month, and Virginia Tech fired
him. 9 Mills argued that his transfer, thirty-four miles by one ac-
count, but forty-eight miles by his preferred route, was controlled
by a provision in the university's faculty handbook, which guar-
52. Cave Hill, 264 Va. at 645, 570 S.E.2d at 793 (citing Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234
Va. 462,465-66, 362 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1987)).
53. Id. (citing Renner Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Renner, 225 Va.
508, 515, 303 S.E.2d 894, 898 (1983)).
54. Id. (quoting Doswell Ltd. P'ship v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 251 Va. 215, 222-23,
468 S.E.2d 84, 88 (1996)).
55. Id. at 646, 570 S.E.2d at 793 (citing Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 187, 313
S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984)).
56. 64 Va. Cir. 251 (Cir. Ct. 2004) (Montgomery County).
57. Id. at 251.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 251-52.
2004]
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anteed written notice before any transfer of more than thirty-five
miles; Mills contended that Virginia Tech's failure to comply with
these terms constituted a material breach.6" Virginia Tech argued
that there was no breach or, alternatively, that any breach was
immaterial.61 The court explained that in order to find a breach
material, it must "find that 'the breach is a failure to do some-
thing that is so fundamental to the contract that the failure to
perform that obligation defeats an essential purpose of the con-
tract."'62 This determination is to be made on a case by case basis,
and not every term within an employment contract is material.
Bearing these principles in mind, the court held:
[T]he plaintiff has failed to prove that Virginia Tech violated the
terms and conditions of the Faculty Handbook, and even if there is
proof of such violation, the violation in this case was not a material
violation of the terms and conditions of the Faculty Handbook. Mr.
Mills' refusal to report to work in Blacksburg was a material breach
of any term and condition of his employment with Virginia Tech and,
therefore, he breached his employment agreement with Virginia
Tech, thereby precluding him from any recovery in this matter.
Mills's breach of contract claim therefore failed.65
B. Fraud in the Inducement
In Godlewski v. Affiliated Computer Services, Inc.,66 employee
Godlewski brought suit alleging breach of contract and fraud in
the inducement against her employer, Affiliated Computer Ser-
vices ("ACS").67 Godlewski contended that ACS "fraudulently in-
duced her" to leave her "extremely lucrative position as a top
60. Id. at 253-54.
61. Id. at 253.
62. Id. at 254 (quoting Horton v. Horton, 254 Va. 111, 115, 487 S.E.2d 200, 204
(1997)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 255.
65. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia was similarly
unsympathetic to an employee's claim for breach of an employment contract, finding that
the plaintiff, who claimed hundreds of thousands of dollars in commissions, was not enti-
tled to said commissions, and that the plaintiffs only chance of recovery was for $7,500
from a sales prize. See McCormick v. Level 3 Communications, L.L.C., 261 F. Supp. 2d
476, 483 (E.D. Va. 2003).
66. 210 F.R.D. 568 (E.D. Va. 2002).
67. Id. at 569.
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sales representative" with her former employer in favor of em-
ployment with ACS.6" She further claimed that ACS never in-
tended to honor its promise of a salary and commission package
which would have been a thirty percent plus increase from her
former salary.69 Godlewski, in the alternative, alleged breach of
employment contract, for she never received said salary and
commission package.7" Defending against her allegations, ACS
argued that no cause of action lies in the tort of fraudulent in-
ducement and that any recovery must be for breach of contract.71
According to the Supreme Court of Virginia, in order to deter-
mine "'whether a cause of action sounds in contract or tort, the
source of the duty violated must be ascertained."'72 Moreover, if a
duty arises from the parties' relationship irrespective of, and not
solely by virtue of, the contract and such duty is breached, the
cause of action is one of tort.73 The Eastern District cited the Su-
preme Court of Virginia's holding in Richmond Metro. Authority
v. McDevitt St. Bovis, Inc.74 for the proposition that "a promisor
who makes a promise, intending not to perform, makes a misrep-
resentation of fact that is actionable as fraud."75 The court noted
further support from the Fourth Circuit in Hitachi Credit Amer-
ica Corp. v. Signet Bank,76 which stated, "[Richmond Metro's]
conclusion is consistent with the distinction in Virginia law
between a statement that is false when made (which is fraud) and
a promise that becomes false only when the promisor later fails to
keep his word (which is breach of contract)."77 Denying ACS'
motion to dismiss the fraudulent inducement claim, the
Godlewski court reasoned:
Ms. Godlewski alleges that ACS never intended to honor the prom-
ises it made to her in luring her away from Servicesoft and to enter
into the employment contract with ACS. She also alleges that she
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting Richmond Metro. Auth. v. McDevitt St. Bovis, Inc., 256 Va. 553, 558,
507 S.E.2d 344, 347 (1998)).
73. Id.; see also Richmond Metro, 256 Va. at 558, 507 S.E.2d at 347.
74. 256 Va. 553, 507 S.E.2d 344 (1998).
75. Godlewski, 210 F.R.D. at 570 (citing Richmond Metro, 256 Va. at 560, 507 S.E.2d
at 348).
76. 166 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 1999).
77. Id. at 631 n.9.
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reasonably relied on ACS' false inducements in leaving her employ-
ment with Servicesoft, and that she suffered damages by relying on
the false inducements. Therefore, Ms. Godlewski's Complaint af-
firmatively alleges all of the elements of a claim for fraud in the in-
ducement and she can prove a set of facts that, if believed, would en-
title her to relief.
Ms. Godlewski's claim of fraudulent inducement survives the cru-
cial distinction between promises which later go unfulfilled and sup-
posed promises which the maker never intended to honor.
78
V. NON-COMPETITION AND NON-SOLICITATION AGREEMENTS AND
FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. Non-Competition and Non-Solicitation Agreements
An employer seeking to enforce a non-competition and non-
solicitation agreement bears the burden of proving that the re-
straint is reasonable 9 in that (1) it is "no greater than necessary
to protect the employer in some legitimate business interest;" (2)
"it is not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing [the em-
ployee's] legitimate business efforts to earn a livelihood;" and (3)
it is consistent with public policy considerations."
In Microstrategy, Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A.,"' the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia applied
the above standard and held that the contested non-solicitation
clause failed each of the three prongs.12 "At the heart" of the case
was the plaintiffs allegation that "the defendants recruited em-
ployees of the plaintiff corporation ... in order for the defendants
to gain access to plaintiffs confidential information."' The agree-
78. Godlewski, 210 F.R.D. at 571.
79. Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 581, 544 S.E.2d 666, 678 (2002) (citing Blue Ridge
Anesthesia v. Gidick, 239 Va. 369, 371-72, 389 S.E.2d 467, 468-69 (1990)).
80. Advanced Maine Enters., Inc. v. PRC, Inc., 256 Va. 106, 118, 501 S.E.2d 148, 155
(1998).
81. No. 2:01CV826, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25866 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2002). For further
discussion of the Microstrategy case in the context of trade secrets and non-competition
agreements, see Michael F. Urbanski, James R. Creekmore & Ellen S. Moore, Annual
Survey of Virginia Law: Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 59, 69-
70 (2003).
82. See Microstrategy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25866, at *17. The contract's savings
clause, however, allowed the offending clause to be severed from the remaining restrictive
covenants. See id. at *18-20.
83. Id. at *4. The plaintiff alleged infringement of patents. Id. at *3.
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ment in question provided, in pertinent part, "I agree that, for the
period of one (1) year after termination of my employment with
MicroStrategy for any reason, I will not, directly or indirectly,
seek to influence any employees, agents, contractors or customers
of MicroStrategy to terminate or modify their relationship with
MicroStrategy."' While the court sided with the plaintiff as to the
reasonableness of the clause's duration, it found that the re-
straint was ambiguous and therefore "greater than necessary to
protect the plaintiffs legitimate business interests."" "A former
employee of the plaintiff has no real yardstick to measure what
actions would" violate the clause, explained the court.86 The
clause was found to violate the second prong of the abuse test as
well, for "[t]he clause will restrict the former employee from ob-
taining any type of job in this industry for fear that it might mod-
ify that employer's relationship with MicroStrategy."7 Finally,
since "[bioth federal and state courts in Virginia have held that
'subjecting the [former] employee to such uncertainty offends
'sound public policy,' 8 the provision also failed the third prong.89
In Professional Heating and Cooling, Inc. v. Smith,9 ° the plain-
tiff employer sought to enforce a "No Piracy Agreement" against
its former employee, a service technician. 9" According to the con-
tract:
The purpose of this agreement... is to establish a two year, no com-
pete period from the date of termination of employment of the named
employee.
During this two year no compete period, the named employee may
not solicit, cause others to solicit, or do any work for any customers
of Professional Heating & Cooling, Inc., from the day of termina-
tion.
92
84. Id. at 12-13.
85. Id. at *17.
86. Id. at*16.
87. Id. at *17.
88. Id. at *15-16 (alteration in original) (quoting Power Distrib. Inc. v. Emergency
Power Eng'g, Inc. 569 F. Supp. 54, 58 (E.D. Va. 1983)).
89. See id. at *17.
90. 64 Va. Cir. 313 (Cir. Ct. 2004) (Norfolk City).
91. Id. at 313.
92. Id. at 314.
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The employee, Don Smith, had resigned and moved to Costa Rica,
intending the relocation to be permanent. 93 Smith sought re-
employment with the plaintiff, however, when the failing health
of a family member necessitated his return to the United States.94
Though Smith signed the "No Piracy" agreement during the
course of his previous employment, he never signed another
agreement upon his return. 95 Interpreting the terms of the con-
tract, the court observed:
"Termination" is unambiguous. It means the "end" or "conclusion"
of something. Smith ended his employment with the plaintiff on
March 2, 2001. His departure at that time was not a "leave of ab-
sence." There was no agreement between Smith and the plaintiff
about the duration of his absence, nor was there any agreement, or
even any expectation that Smith would return to work for the plain-
tiff. There is no provision in the agreement or any overriding princi-
ple of law that would toll the running of the two year period or reim-
pose the entire period when Smith resumed employment. To do so
would re-write the parties' contract and violate the rule to strictly
construe such agreements.
96
Thus, the court sustained Smith's demurrer for the breach of con-
tract claim.97
In International Paper Co. v. Brooks,9" when a former employee
terminated his employment with the plaintiff employer and se-
cured a new job with its competitor, the employer brought suit for
breach of an anti-solicitation clause of a non-compete agree-
ment.9 9 The employer, International Paper Company ("IPC"),
claimed that the employee solicited its employees for positions
with his new employer; in fact, three employees resigned from
IPC to seek such employment. 00 The anti-solicitation clause in
question provided: "Employee agrees, in consideration of the mu-
tual covenants set forth herein, that he/she will agree not to so-
93. Id. at 313.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 315. The court found support for its position in the case of Reagan Outdoor
Adver. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984).
97. Professional Heating, 64 Va. Cir. at 314.
98. 63 Va. Cir. 494 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Roanoke City).
99. Id. at 494-95. International Paper Company also alleged tortious interference
with contract, conspiracy to injure business, and common law conspiracy, demurrers to
which claims were all sustained with leave to amend. Id. at 495.
100. Id. at 494-95.
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licit other employees of the Employer to join Employee (new em-
ployer) in a newly formed business, in direct competition with
Employer."' 01 The court held:
When strictly construed against the employer/drafter.., the provi-
sion's indefinite "agreement to agree" language, combined with the
absence of key terms such as geography and duration, clearly indi-
cates that later negotiations are necessary for the provision to take
effect. Even if the clause were permissible under Virginia's public
policy, its language would still be too vague and indefinite to be en-
forceable.
10 2
Beyond the issue of enforceability, continued the court, IPC failed
to allege facts to support its claim of breach.0 3 The employee did
not create his own business; rather, he joined a previously exist-
ing competitor. 14 Accordingly, the court sustained the defendant's
demurrer as to breach. 10
5
In Totten v. Employee Benefits Management, Inc.,106 a former
employee brought suit to enjoin a former employer from enforcing
provisions within a contract regarding confidentiality and non-
solicitation.0 7 Finding that any unenforceable clauses were sev-
erable and thus any remaining clauses enforceable,'0 8 the court
next considered the enforceability of the confidentiality and non-
solicitation provisions. Because the confidentiality agreement (1)
prohibited disclosure of the employer's proprietary information;
(2) was not greater than necessary to protect the employer's in-
terests; and (3) was not deemed to preclude the employee from se-
curing a livelihood, it was found to be enforceable. 109 Conversely,
the court held the non-solicitation language to be unenforceable
because:
The restrictions here are both uncertain as to time and overly broad
as to scope. They suffer from the same infirmities as the non-
101. Id. at 494.
102. Id. at 497.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 61 Va. Cir. 77 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Roanoke County).
107. Id. at 77.
108. Id. at 78 ("Looking at the contract as a whole,.., the Court finds that it was the
intent of the parties to preserve the balance of the agreement in the event that some por-
tions were found to be void.").
109. Id.
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competition portion of the contract earlier struck down. At their best,
they contain ambiguities that must be construed against the em-
ployer. At their worst, they form a part of the non-competition clause
and are dependent upon its efficacy for their survival. 11°
B. Fiduciary Duty
The Supreme Court of Virginia confronted an employer's
claims against a former employee for breach of fiduciary duty... in
Williams v. Dominion Technology Partners, L.L.C. 2 The plaintiff
,Dominion Technology Partners, L.L.C. ("Dominion"), was an em-
ployment firm that recruited and temporarily placed computer
consultants with businesses, either directly or through other bro-
kers. "' 3 Dominion recruited Williams to install software in a
manufacturing firm, Stihl."4 Ultimately, Williams gained em-
ployment at Stihl through a third-party broker, under a previ-
ously existing contract; thus, Dominion and the third party bro-
ker each received a portion of Williams's earnings.1 5 As Williams
never signed an employment contract with Dominion, he eventu-
ally terminated his at-will employment with Dominion in favor of
working directly for the broker, a more lucrative arrangement.116
Dominion's allegation of breach of fiduciary duty was predicated
on the following conduct: "Williams, after having learned that his
services as a computer consultant were likely to be needed at
Stihl for an extended period of time, and while still an employee
110. Id. at 79.
111. In Professional Heating and Cooling, Inc. v. Smith, 64 Va. Cir. 313 (Norfolk City),
where a former employee resigned in favor of employment with the plaintiffs competitor,
the court overruled defendant employee's demurrer, but in doing so said,
I do not find from the evidence at the hearing that the plaintiff is ultimately
likely to prevail on this claim. There is no evidence Smith took any docu-
ments or records; if he used anything, he used only his memory of the plain-
tiffs labor rate and the identity of its customers, which he properly acquired
during his employment. This is permissible.
Id. at 315.
112. 265 Va. 280, 576 S.E.2d 752 (2003). For additional discussion of the case see John
R. Walk, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Civil Practice and Procedure, 39 U. RICH. L. REV.
87, 94-96 (2004). See also Urbanski, et al., supra note 81, at 81-82.
113. Williams, 265 Va. at 283, 576 S.E.2d at 753.
114. Id. at 284, 576 S.E.2d at 753.
115. Id. at 284, 576 S.E.2d at 754.
116. Id. at 287, 576 S.E.2d at 755-56.
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of Dominion, arranged with [the broker] to become its employee
effective upon his resignation from Dominion."117
The Williams case confirmed a common law principle that the
Supreme Court of Virginia has long recognized-that employees,
including employees-at-will, owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to
their employers during employment."' Elaborating on this duty,
the court explained:
Subsumed within this general duty of loyalty is the more specific
duty that the employee not compete with his employer during his
employment. Nonetheless, in the absence of a contract restriction re-
garding this duty of loyalty, an employee has the right to make ar-
rangements during his employment to compete with his employer af-
ter resigning his post. The employee's right in such circumstances is
not absolute. Rather, "[tihis right, based on a policy of free competi-
tion, must be balanced with the importance of the integrity and fair-
ness attaching to the relationship between employer and employee."
Thus, "[ulnder certain circumstances, the exercise of the right may
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty .... Whether specific conduct
taken prior to resignation breaches a fiduciary duty requires a case
by case analysis."'
In determining whether conduct amounts to breach, courts are
to be mindful, however, that harm done to an employer at an em-
ployee's hands does not alone establish an actionable breach of
duty. 2 ° The rationale behind this guidepost is that "the law will
not provide relief to every 'disgruntled player in the rough-and-
tumble world comprising the competitive marketplace,' especially
where, through more prudent business practices, the harm com-
plained of could easily have been avoided."' 2 '
Entering judgment in favor of Williams,'22 the court reasoned
that:
117. Id. at 290, 576 S.E.2d at 757.
118. Id. at 289, 576 S.E.2d at 757 (citing Home v. Holley, 167 Va. 234, 241, 188 S.E.
169, 172 (1936)).
119. Id. (quoting Feddeman & Co. v. Langan Assocs., 260 Va. 35, 42, 530 S.E.2d 668,
672 (2000)).
120. Id. at 290, 576 S.E.2d at 758.
121. Id. at 290-91, 576 S.E.2d at 758 (quoting ITT Hartford Group, Inc. v. Virginia Fi-
nancial Assocs., Inc., 258 Va. 193, 204, 520 S.E.2d 355, 361 (1999)).
122. Id. at 292, 576 S.E.2d at 759. The court reversed the trial court's judgments in fa-
vor of Dominion on its claims of tortious interference with a business relationship and
business conspiracy "[b]ecause the same conduct was alleged to constitute the proof of the
'intentional misconduct' and 'legal malice' elements of the two other theories of liability
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Williams had the right to make the necessary arrangements to re-
sign from his employment with Dominion in such a way as to take
advantage of a higher level of compensation if his services at Stihl
were needed beyond the month-to-month arrangement then in place,
so long as those arrangements were not disloyal or unfair to Domin-
ion.
... [Ilt cannot be said that Williams' conduct to safeguard his own
interests was either disloyal or unfair to Dominion. Rather, we are of
the opinion that Dominion's contracts provided it with nothing more
than "a subjective belief or hope that the business relationship[s]
would continue and merely a possibility that future economic benefit
would accrue to it."
1 23
In H.E.R.C. Products, Inc. v. Turlington,'24 the Norfolk City
Circuit Court considered an employer's claim for breach of fiduci-
ary duty.'25 H.E.R.C., which provided cleaning services for ships,
hired Turlington to aid in the preparation of a renewal bid for its
existing Navy contract.'26 H.E.R.C. alleged that Turlington "gath-
ered confidential information from his employer and planned
with the other named defendants to set up a business to compete
with HERC."'27 Defendants' business subsequently underbid
H.E.R.C., and H.E.R.C. did not receive a renewal of a military
contract. 28 Extensively citing Williams v. Dominion Technology
Partners, the court held that H.E.R.C. had stated a cause of ac-
tion for breach of fiduciary duty against Turlington. 2 9
VI. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND NEGLIGENCE IN HIRING,
SUPERVISION, AND RETENTION
A. Respondeat Superior
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior an employer in Vir-
ginia may be held liable for the tortious acts committed by its
presented by Dominion." Id.
123. Id. at 291-92, 576 S.E.2d at 758 (quoting Commercial Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Halifax
Corp., 253 Va. 292, 303, 484 S.E.2d 892, 898 (1997)).
124. 62 Va. Cir. 489 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Norfolk City).
125. Id. at 489.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 489-90.
128. Id. at 490.
129. Id. at 490-91 (citing Williams v. Dominion Technology Partners, L.L.C., 265 Va.
280, 289-92, 576 S.E.2d 752, 757-59 (2003)). The court sustained demurrers against all
defendants except Turlington, holding that only he owed any duty to H.E.R.C. Id. at 491.
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employers while: (1) performing their employer's business and (2)
acting within the scope of their employment. 3 ° The critical issue
is whether the service in which the tortious act occurred was
within the ordinary course of the employer's business. 3 '
1. Independent Contractors
The Supreme Court of Virginia examined respondeat superior
in the context of an independent contractor in Southern Floors &
Acoustics, Inc. v. Max-Yeboah. 32 In Southern Floors, a Food Lion
customer tripped over a stack of tiles left in the aisle by employ-
ees of the subcontractors, Southern Floors and Acoustics,
("Southern Floors") who had been contracted to re-tile parts of the
grocery store.133 The customer sustained a broken ankle in the fall
and subsequently filed suit for negligence, naming both Food Lion
and Southern Floors as defendants.' At trial, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the customer, holding Food Lion and Southern
Floors jointly and severally liable; 135 on appeal, both parties con-
tested their liability.136 As a threshold issue, the supreme court
declared that "Southern Floors was clearly an independent con-
tractor." 37 "'An independent contractor,"' the court noted "'is one
who undertakes to produce a given result without being in any
130. See Kensington Assocs. v. West, 234 Va. 430, 432, 362 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1987); see
also Giant of Maryland, Inc. v. Enger, 257 Va. 513, 515, 515 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1999).
131. Enger, 257 Va. at 516, 515 S.E.2d at 112 (quoting Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 77-
78, 112 S.E. 628, 631 (1922)).
132. 267 Va. 682, 594 S.E.2d 908 (2004). Also at issue was the plaintiffs contributory
negligence; the court held that this issue was properly submitted to the jury. Id. at 686,
594 S.E.2d at 911.
133. Id. at 684-85, 594 S.E.2d at 909-10.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 685, 594 S.E.2d at 910.
136. Id. at 686, 594 S.E.2d at 910.
137. Id. at 687, 594 S.E.2d at 911. In determining whether a person is an independent
contractor or agent, the following four factors must be analyzed: "'(1) selection and en-
gagement of the servant, (2) payment of compensation, (3) power of dismissal, and (4)
power of control,'" the last of which is the controlling factor. Hadeed v. Medic-24, Ltd., 237
Va. 277, 288, 377 S.E.2d 589, 594-95 (1989) (quoting Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 418-
19, 290 S.E.2d 825, 832 (1982)); see also Steffan v. Freemason Assocs., Inc., 60 Va. Cir.
216, 217 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Norfolk City) (finding a realtor to be an agent of the real estate
company). This inquiry is most commonly one for a jury. Hadeed, 237 Va. at 288, 377
S.E.2d at 594. If the evidence leads to one conclusion, or the answer is rooted in written
documents, then the inquiry becomes one of law. Steffan, 60 Va. Cir. at 217 (finding that
the determination of independent contractor status was one of law because "the question
of agency rests entirely on the interpretation" of certain contracts).
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way controlled as to the method by which he attains that re-
sult.""38 The court went on to explain that where third parties in-
cur injury on the premises of a property owner due to conditions
caused by an independent contractor, the property owner may be
vicariously liable for the acts of the contractor, or may be directly
liable for the owner's negligence. 139
As to vicarious liability, the supreme court observed that the
general rule states that "'an owner who employs an independent
contractor is not liable for injuries to third persons caused by the
contractor's negligence."'14 There are, however, exceptions to this
general rule. For example, the doctrine of respondeat superior
would apply "if the independent contractor's torts arise directly
out of his use of a dangerous instrumentality, arise out of work
that is inherently dangerous, are wrongful per se, are a nuisance,
or are such that it would in the natural course of events produce
injury unless special precautions were taken."' Since the trial
court dismissed all vicarious liability claims, though, the only
theory of liability examined on appeal was direct liability for neg-
ligence in "'failing to see that proper warnings and safety condi-
tions existed at the scene of the work.'"'4 Holding that the trial
court committed reversible error in allowing the issue of vicarious
liability to go to the jury and that Food Lion was neither vicari-
ously nor directly liable, the supreme court declared:
It is illogical and antithetical to the definition of an independent con-
tractor to impose a duty to supervise upon the principal when the es-
sence of the relationship is lack of power and control to supervise.
Food Lion had no duty to supervise the means and method of the
work of Southern Floors and cannot be found independently negli-
gent for failing to do so.
143
2. Apparent Agency
The issue of whether Virginia recognizes vicarious liability un-
der the doctrine of apparent agency in negligence actions arose in
138. Southern Floors, 267 Va. at 687, 594 S.E.2d at 911 (quoting Craig v. Doyle, 179
Va. 526, 531, 19 S.E.2d 675, 677 (1942)).
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Kesler v. Allen, 233 Va. 130, 134, 353 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1987)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 688, 594 S.E.2d at 911.
143. Id. at 689, 594 S.E.2d at 912 (citing MacCoy v. Colony House Builders, 239 Va. 64,
69, 387 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1990); Craig, 179 Va. at 531, 19 S.E.2d at 677).
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Sanchez v. Medicorp Health System. 4 4 Sanchez, a truck driver,
sustained injuries in a collision and was treated in a hospital
emergency room by the attending physician, who was employed
by the Fredericksburg Emergency Medical Associates
("FEMA"). 145 Alleging deficient care, Sanchez filed suit against
the physician, FEMA, and Medicorp Health System ("Medicorp")
which operated the hospital, claiming that the doctor and other
medical personnel were "apparent agents, ostensible agents,
and/or agents by estoppel" of Medicorp.' 46 In response, Medicorp
filed the demurrer at issue in the instant case.
141
The court pointed out that in contract law, one who reasonably
appears to have the authority to act on behalf of another, even
though he does not have such authority, is an apparent agent and
binds the principal in the same manner as if he possessed such
actual authority.141 "Courts in some jurisdictions have applied
this concept of apparent agency to negligence actions, at least in
the context of physician-hospital relationships."1 49 The Sanchez
court considered such an application:
[T]he doctrine of apparent agency is not merely an extension of the
doctrine of respondeat superior. In fact, it is quite different. The doc-
trine of respondeat superior imposes liability on a master for the
negligent act of its servant where such act is performed in the course
of employment because the master has the right to control that per-
formance. The doctrine of apparent agency applies to cases where
admittedly there is no control; in fact, there is no real master-
servant relationship. 
150
Bearing this in mind, the court ultimately declined to impinge
upon the province of the legislature by extending the doctrine of
apparent agency to negligence cases.' 5 ' Sustaining Medicorp's
demurrer, 152 the court held that "Virginia does not recognize the
doctrine of apparent agency in this type of case." 53
144. 64 Va. Cir. 207 (Cir. Ct. 2004) (Fredericksburg City).
145. Id. at 207.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 208.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 210.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 209. The court went on to quote Professor Charles Friend, who wrote that in
2004]
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B. Negligence in Hiring, Supervision, and Retention
Direct negligence claims against an employer differ from
claims attributable to the employer vicariously by application of
the respondeat superior doctrine. 54 The fundamental issue in
such claims is whether the employer unreasonably exposed others
to a risk of harm by hiring and/or retaining an unsuitable em-
ployee. 15 5
In Clements v. MCV Associated Physicians,56 the court was
faced with a claim for negligent hiring. The plaintiffs decedent
died of complications from heart surgery, and the plaintiff alleged
that the attendant physician had failed to properly diagnose and
treat the decedent's fatal condition.'57 Suit was filed against the
physician, the Medical College of Virginia, which employed and
extended practice privileges to the doctor, and Virginia Common-
wealth University, where the doctor held a faculty appoint-
ment. 15
8
Plaintiffs negligent hiring claim was predicated upon the phy-
sician's failure to pass the General Surgery Board Certification
Examination and his subsequent ineligibility to take the Cardio-
Thoracic Surgery Boards, which the plaintiff claimed rendered
the physician incompetent as a cardio-thoracic surgeon. 59 The
court explained the requisite elements of a negligent hiring claim
as follows:
For a claim of negligent hiring, Plaintiff must allege that the em-
ployee had a known propensity of being a danger to others in the
past, the employer knew or should have known through reasonable
discovery about these acts, and the employer hired an unfit employee
and placed him in a situation where he could create an unreasonable
risk of harm to others.
160
Virginia it is "'questionable at best" whether "'apparent authority alone is sufficient to
make a master liable for personal injuries inflicted by a servant.'" Id. at 209-10 (quoting
CHARLES FRIEND, PERSONAL INJURY LAW IN VIRGINIA 213 n.32 (3d ed. 2003)).
154. Interim Personnel of Cent. Va., Inc., v. Messer, 263 Va. 435, 440-41, 559 S.E. 2d
704, 707 (2002).
155. J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 236 Va. 206, 211, 372 S.E.2d 391, 394
(1988); see also Southeastern Apartments Mgmt., Inc. v. Jackman, 257 Va. 256, 260, 513
S.E.2d 395, 397 (1999).
156. 61 Va. Cir. 673 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Richmond City).
157. Id. at 674
158. See id. at 674-75.
159. Id. at 674.
160. Id. at 676 (citing Interim Personnel of Cent. Va., Inc. v. Messer, 263 Va. 435, 440,
559 S.E.2d 704, 707) (2002)).
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The court dismissed all claims of negligent hiring because the
plaintiff failed to allege that the doctor was a danger to others,
that the defendant employers knew or should have known that
the doctor would commit acts which were dangerous to others, or
that the doctor's employment posed an unreasonable risk to pa-
tients. 161 The court further explained that "[fiailure to pass the
Board exams in and of itself is not an indication that a person has
a known propensity for dangerous activity."162
In Padilla v. Silver Diner,'63 discussed above,'64 former employ-
ees of the Silver Diner brought a negligent retention claim
against the restaurant, alleging that the Silver Diner had actual
knowledge that other employees "were likely to assault, falsely
imprison, and otherwise harm their female co-workers"-the
plaintiffs.'65 The court began its analysis of the case by stating
that recovery of damages was not barred by the Workers' Com-
pensation Act because the alleged injury was "not the result of an
accident arising out of employment.' 66 Moreover, though defen-
dants claimed that the conduct of one employee against another
was not actionable under a theory of negligent retention, the
court disagreed and overruled defendants' demurrer. 167
As contrasted with negligent retention and hiring claims, the
Supreme Court of Virginia does not recognize negligent supervi-
161. Id. at 676-77.
162. Id. at 677.
163. 63 Va. Cir. 50 (Cir. Ct, 2003) (Virginia Beach City).
164. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
165. Padilla, 63 Va. Cir. at 56.
166. Id. Under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-100 to -
1310 (Repl Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2004), an employee is limited to her remedies under
the Act for all injuries "arising out of and in the course of the employment" as defined un-
der the Act. Id. § 65.2-101 (Cum. Supp. 2004). The Act provides that "[t]he rights and
remedies herein granted to an employee ... shall exclude all other rights and remedies of
such employee.., at common law or otherwise." Id. § 65.2-307 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum.
Supp. 2004). "The Act is highly remedial and should be liberally construed" in favor of cov-
erage. Henderson v. Cent. Tel. Co., 233 Va. 377, 382, 355 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1987). Thus,
when the plaintiff incurs an injury in the course of her employment, she ordinarily has no
right to pursue a common law action. See, e.g., Kimmell v. Seven Up Bottling Co., 993 F.2d
410, 412-13 (4th Cir. 1993); Plummer v. Landmark Communications, Inc., 235 Va. 78, 84,
366 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1988). For a further discussion of the coverage of the Virginia Workers'
Compensation Act, see Lawrence W. Tarr & Salvatore Lupica, Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Workers' Compensation, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 475 (2004).
167. Padilla, 63 Va. Cir. at 56.
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sion claims. 6 ' Based on this distinction, one court recently held
that Virginia law does not impose a duty on a partner in a law
firm to supervise associates." 9 The court noted, however, that
failure to do so may in some cases result in a disciplinary pro-
ceeding for violation of the Virginia Rules of Professional Con-
duct. 1
70
VII. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
Upon termination of the employment relationship, an eligible
employee must receive unemployment benefits, barring any con-
duct which would disqualify the employee from benefits. 17' The
Virginia Employment Commission (the "Commission" or the
"VEC") will disqualify a claimant from receiving unemployment
benefits if it determines that the employee: (1) left work voluntar-
ily without good cause, or (2) was discharged for misconduct con-
nected with work. 72 The employer bears the burden of proof on
these issues.
7 3
With regard to judicial review of VEC determinations, Virginia
Code section 60.2-625(A) provides, "[T]he findings of the Commis-
sion as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of
fraud, shall be conclusive,' 74 and the jurisdiction of the court shall
be confined to questions of law."1 75 Two well-established princi-
ples guide judicial review of the VEC's decisions. First, the VEC
168. C & P Tel. Co. of Va. v. Dowdy, 235 Va. 55, 61, 365 S.E.2d 751, 754 (1988) (declin-
ing to recognize the tort of negligent supervision or impose a duty of reasonable care upon
an employer in the supervision of its employees).
169. Lockney v. Vroom, 61 Va. Cir. 359, 368 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Norfolk City).
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Actuarial Benefits & Design Corp. v. Va. Employment Comm'n, 23 Va.
App. 640, 644-45, 478 S.E.2d 735, 737-38 (Ct. App. 1996); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-
618 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
172. Actuarial Benefits, 23 Va. App. at 645, 478 S.E.2d at 738.
173. Id.; Garland v. Va. Employment Comm'n, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 585, at *16 (Ct.
App. 2000) (unpublished decision).
174. In Mills v. Virginia Employment Commission, 61 Va. Cir. 443 (Cir. Ct. 2003)
(Spotsylvania County), the Court affirmed the VEC's finding that an employee auto me-
chanic voluntarily terminated the employment relationship without good cause, disquali-
fying him from receipt of benefits. Id. at 446. When the employer suggested that the em-
ployee was taking too long on a task, a dispute arose and the employer told the employee
to quit "if he did not like the way he was being treated." Id. at 445-46.
175. VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-625(A) (Rep. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
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"is charged with the responsibility of resolving questions of credi-
bility and of controverted facts,"176 and therefore, in the absence
of fraud, "the dispositive question is whether the Commission's
findings of fact were supported by evidence."'77 Second, "the
courts must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to
the finding by the Commission."7 '
A. Voluntary Departure Versus Discharge for Misconduct
In Peck v. Virginia Employment Commission,'79 the Court of
Appeals of Virginia considered an employer's appeal from a final
order of the trial court affirming the VEC's award of unemploy-
ment benefits to his "'nanny/housekeeper."'"" 0 Preceding the em-
ployee's dismissal, Mrs. Peck advised the employee that she
needed boxes to prepare to "'show the house"' to buyers, as the
family was "'exploring the possibility of moving."""' The claimant
volunteered to acquire the boxes, but at a later date."8 2 Finding
this unsatisfactory, Mrs. Peck "'obtained the boxes herself" and
"'discharged' claimant the same day, effective a couple of weeks
later. 8 3 Upon examination of the employee's claim for benefits,
the VEC found that the Pecks were generally happy with the
claimant, that they agreed to help her find new employment and
to provide "a favorable reference," and that prior to the claimant's
dismissal, the Pecks intended to 'replace ... claimant because
she seemed more interested in performing the duties of a nanny
only and seemed to object to doing housework chores."'184
The Pecks claimed that the claimant voluntarily resigned with-
out good cause. 8 The Pecks' claim of voluntary resignation was
176. Va. Employment Comm'n v. Gantt, 7 Va. App. 631, 635, 376 S.E.2d 808, 811 (Ct.
App. 1989), affd en banc, 9 Va. App. 225, 385 S.E.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1989).
177. Brady v. Human Res. Inst., 231 Va. 28, 29, 340 S.E.2d 797, 798 (1986).
178. Va. Employment Comm'n v. Peninsula Emergency Physicians, Inc., 4 Va. App.
621, 626, 359 S.E.2d 552, 554 (Ct. App. 1987).
179. No. 2469-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 517 (Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2002) (unpublished
decision).
180. Id. at *3-5.
181. Id. at *3.
182. See id.
183. Id. at *3-4.
184. Id. at *4.
185. Id. at *1-2. The employer also contended that his due process rights were violated
by the VEC's "Appeals Examiner," who did not allow admission of certain evidence or
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based upon the claimant's agreement as to her last day of work,
and, under these circumstances, the court found this argument
unpersuasive. l' Thus, as to the Pecks' claim of voluntary resig-
nation, the court held that the employer had failed to satisfy the
burden of proof to show that the employee "left work voluntar-
ily. "187
Alternatively, the Pecks argued that the claimant was dis-
charged for misconduct, disqualifying her from receipt of bene-
fits."' The court laid out the standard for misconduct as follows:
An employee is guilty of "misconduct connected with his work" when
he deliberately violates a company rule reasonably designed to pro-
tect the legitimate business interests of his employer, or when his
acts or omissions are of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest
a willful disregard of those interests and the duties and obligations
he owes his employer.1
8 9
As with voluntary resignation, the burden of proving miscon-
duct lies with the employer.' 90 Affirming the decision of the trial
court with respect to the award of unemployment benefits to the
claimant, the court said:
The record before us suggests no violation of an employment rule,
and the factual findings of the VEC, supported by the evidence, es-
tablished no willful disregard of employer's interests by claimant.
She was not directed to obtain the packing boxes, and the responsi-
bility was not among her assigned duties. To the contrary, claimant
volunteered for the task only as an accommodation to employer's
wife. Accordingly, the VEC correctly determined claimant was not
discharged for employment-related misconduct.
19 1
cross-examination of the claimant as to her resignation. Id. at *5. The court held, however,
that the issue had not been preserved for appeal. Id. at *5-7.
186. Id. at *7-9. '"The term 'voluntary' connotes 'unconstrained by interference; unim-
pelled by another's influence; spontaneous; acting of oneself.., resulting from free
choice.'" Id. at *8-9 (citing Shuler v. Va. Employment Comm'n, 9 Va. App. 147, 150-51,
384 S.E.2d 122, 124 (Ct. App. 1989)).
187. Id.
188. Id. at *9; see VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-618(2) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
189. Peck, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 517, at *9 (citing Branch v. Va. Employment Comm'n,
219 Va. 609, 611, 249 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1978)). Where an employee removed a previously
terminated employee's computer hard drive from the employer's premises without au-
thorization, this action amounted to misconduct and the employee was properly denied
benefits. Zugg v. Va. Employment Comm'n, 63 Va. Cir. 429, 430 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Loudoun
County). Further, the benefits received before this determination were to be repaid. Id.
190. Peck, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 517, at *9-10.
191. Id. at *10.
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B. Voluntary Departure and Good Cause
In Lindeman v. Virginia Employment Commission,"2 the Court
of Appeals of Virginia was faced with an employee's appeal from a
denial of unemployment benefits.'93 The employee, Lindeman,
worked as an auto mechanic and suffered an injury at work. 194
Upon learning that his employer did not carry the required work-
ers' compensation insurance, Lindeman "became angry, cursed at
[his employer], and quit his job."' 95 The employer had, however,
promised Lindeman that he "'would take care of his medical bills'
and lost wages if 'the doctor suggested that he take a certain
amount of time off."" 96 At the time of Lindeman's injury, the em-
ployer was operating under the wrong impression that such in-
surance was not required based on the fact that he did not have
three full-time employees. 9 7 Two weeks after Lindeman quit, the
employer obtained the proper coverage.' 98
Upon filing a claim for unemployment benefits, Lindeman con-
tended that, though his departure was voluntary, the failure to
carry workers' compensation insurance constituted good cause for
leaving his employment, thereby entitling him to benefits. 99 As
Lindeman conceded, he voluntarily terminated the employment
relationship; therefore, he bore the burden of showing good cause
to do so.2 °° Since neither the legislature nor the Supreme Court of
Virginia had defined good cause,2"' the court of appeals applied its
own analysis:
[T]he commission and the reviewing courts must first apply an objec-
tive standard to the reasonableness of the employment dispute and
then to the reasonableness of the employee's efforts to resolve that
dispute before leaving the employment. In making this two-part
analysis, the claimant's claim must be viewed from the standpoint of
a reasonable employee. "Factors that... are peculiar to the em-
192. No. 1842-03-3, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 88 (Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2004) (unpublished de-
cision).
193. Id. at *1.
194. Id. at *2.
195. Id. at *3.
196. Id. at *2.
197. Id. at *3.
198. Id.
199. Id. at *4.
200. Id. at *5.
201. Id.
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ployee and her situation are factors which are appropriately consid-
ered as to whether good cause existed .... .202
As to the first prong, the court found that the evidence sup-
ported a finding that Lindeman had acted unreasonably.2 °3
Though an employee may understandably be concerned about
compensation for his injuries, Lindeman's employer told him that
he would receive such desired compensation.2 4 Furthermore,
Lindeman could have "gained actual knowledge of his legal rights
as contained in the Workers' Compensation Act if he had con-
tacted" the VEC before his voluntary departure.2 5 Regarding the
second prong, the court determined that, after learning of the
employer's failure to carry workers' compensation insurance, Lin-
deman became angry and terminated his employment "without
exploring the other statutory avenues through which he would be
entitled to compensation for his injury or giving employer a rea-
sonable time in which to comply with the law. '206 Therefore, the
court affirmed the denial of unemployment compensation for vol-
untary departure without good cause.20 7
Virginia Employment Commission v. Hill20 involved the VEC's
appeal of a Wise County Circuit Court judgment awarding bene-
fits to its former employee. 209 The employee, Hill, worked as a sec-
retary in a medical office. 210 Hill's frequent absence from work for
personal reasons prompted her employer to confront her with this
issue.211 Upon confrontation, Hill quit her job.2"2 The VEC denied
202. Id. at *6 (quoting Umbarger v. Va. Employment Comm'n, 12 Va. App. 431, 435-
36, 404 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Ct. App. 1991)).
203. See id. at *8-9.
204. Id. at *9.
205. Id.
206. Id. at*1l.
207. Id. In Kosiek v. Virginia Employment Commission, 59 Va. Cir. 277 (Cir. Ct. 2002)
(Norfolk City), where claimant nurse refused to come to work in order to attend weight
loss meetings, after being warned that failure to report to work would result in discharge,
the VEC did not find good cause. Id. at 278. On appeal, the court held that a reasonable
employee would have attended other available meetings, and that the employee failed to
make '"every effort to eliminate or adjust.., the difference or conditions" which offended
her. Id. at 281 (quoting Lee v. Va. Employment Comm'n, 1 Va. App. 82, 85, 335 S.E.2d
104, 106 (Ct. App. 1985)).
208. No. 1436-03-3, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 210 (Ct. App. May 4, 2004) (unpublished
opinion).
209. Id. at *1-2.
210. Id. at *3.
211. See id. at *6.
212. Id. at *5.
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compensation, citing as grounds Hill's voluntary departure with-
out good cause. 213 The trial court subsequently reversed the VEC,
concluding that "'Hill voluntarily left work [because] the threat of
discharge prompted her to resign employment to avoid being fired
and to protect her work record.'
214
On appeal, the VEC argued that the trial court "improperly ig-
nored" its findings and failed to apply the statutorily prescribed
and highly deferential scope of review. 215 According to the Com-
mission, Hill's "resignation was submitted in anticipation of
rather than in lieu of discharge so that it can still be considered
as a voluntary leaving. 211 Considering the evidence in a light
most favorable to the VEC, the court of appeals held that the trial
court erred in conducting its own fact-finding expedition and that
the record corroborated the VEC's findings. 217 Accordingly, the
court denied the benefits to Hill.218
VIII. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The following is a summary of legislation impacting workplace
law from the 2004 General Assembly Sessions.
A. Employee Protection
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 18.2-
465.1 to provide that employees summoned to jury duty are not
required to work the day of jury service. 29 This change goes into
effect July 1, 2005.22°
213. Id. at *9-12.
214. Id. at *12.
215. Id. at *1-2.
216. Id. at *11.
217. See id. at *12-14. -[T]he Commission's findings of fact, if supported by evidence
and in the absence of fraud, are made conclusive [by Code § 60.2-625(A)], and the jurisdic-
tion of the circuit court is confined to questions of law.'" Id. at *12 (quoting Va. Employ-
ment Comm'n v. City of Virginia Beach, 222 Va. 728, 734, 284 S.E.2d 595, 598 (1981)).
218. See id. at *16-17
219. Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 800, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-465.1 (Repl. Vol. Supp. 2004)).
220. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-465.1.
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B. Unemployment Compensation
Virginia Code section 60.2-513, "Failure of employing unit to
file reports; assessment and amount of penalty," was amended,
increasing the late filing fee from $30 to $75.221 Employers may
avoid this penalty, however, upon a showing of good cause for
failure to file any such report.222
The General Assembly also amended and reenacted section
60.2-612(8), the "benefit eligibility conditions," to provide that
where an employee has resigned, and his employer terminates
him before the date specified by that employee in resigning, the
employee shall be liable for no more than two weeks of benefits,
where good cause for resignation or misconduct are lacking.
2 1
C. Day of Rest Statute
When the General Assembly repealed Virginia's antiquated
"blue laws" on Sunday closings during this past session (SB-659),
it inadvertently eliminated exemptions to Virginia's "day of rest
statute," which is set forth in Virginia Code section 40.1-28.1 et
seq.224 Thus, as of July 2, 2004, portions of the "day of rest stat-
ute" became enforceable without exemptions, igniting a furor in
Virginia's business community.2 5 With no exemptions in effect,
every employer must allow each employee at least twenty-four
consecutive hours of rest in each calendar week, except for emer-
gencies; 22' non-managerial employees, as a matter of right, may
request Sunday as the day of rest, without fear of penalty, disci-
pline, or discharge; 27 and non-managerial employees, as a matter
of right, may request Saturday-if the employee truly observes
Saturday as the Sabbath-as the day of rest, without fear of pen-
221. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 495, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 60.2-513 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
222. VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-513.
223. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 496, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 60.2-612 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
224. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 608, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-
28.5 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2004)).
225. See VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.5.
226. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.1 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
227. Id. § 40.1-28.2 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
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alty, discipline, or discharge.228 Violations constitute misdemean-
ors, carry fines between $250-$500 per each offense, and entitle
employees to triple pay if they are forced to work in violation of
the statute.229
Governor Warner convened a special legislative session of the
General Assembly on July 13, 2004. During this single purpose
session, the General Assembly passed emergency legislation, SB-
6002, which restored the previous eighteen exemptions to the day
of rest statute by adding section 40.1-28.4:1.23° Since the General
Assembly designated this legislation as emergency, it took effect
immediately upon Governor Warner's signature, which occurred
minutes after the special session.231
Because of this new legislation, businesses and industries that
were exempt before July 1, are also exempt again.232 Thus, most
of Virginia's private employers are not subject to the day of rest
legislation, since they fit under these restored exemptions.233
However, many businesses have discovered they were never ex-
empt from the day of rest statute, and still are not exempt. Ef-
forts to expand the list of exemptions must wait for the 2005
General Assembly session. In addition, challenges to the constitu-
tionality of the Sabbath provision of the day of rest rule may still
occur.
IX. CONCLUSION
Though the past two years lacked blockbuster decisions regard-
ing the employment-at-will doctrine, it is clear from the Supreme
Court of Virginia's opinion in Cave Hill that the doctrine remains
intact. Further, plaintiffs had no luck in their effort to expand the
public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, as evinced by the
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia's
rejection of such an attempt in Swain. While recent Virginia deci-
sions on these matters have tended to favor employers, a circuit
228. Id. § 40.1-28.3 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
229. Id. § 40.1-28.4 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
230. Act of July 13, 2004, ch. 1, 2004 Va. Acts __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-
28.4:1).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See id.
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court's holding in Padilla may give employers cause for concern;
the court overruled defendants' demurrer to plaintiffs' construc-
tive discharge claim, albeit under egregious circumstances.
Virginia courts appeared to look favorably on employees' claims
in other areas of labor and employment law. In Godlewski, for in-
stance, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia was sympathetic to an employee's claim of fraudulent
inducement. Similarly, in Microstrategy, the Eastern District
struck down a non-solicitation clause as unreasonable. Likewise,
in Williams, though the Supreme Court confirmed that at-will
employees owe a fiduciary duty to their employers during em-
ployment, the court refused to impose liability for breach present
under the circumstances.
Plaintiffs were often unsuccessful in holding employers liable
under the theories of respondeat superior and negligence in hir-
ing, supervision, and retention over the past two years. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to hold accountable
an employer for the acts of an independent contractor in Southern
Floors. In addition, a circuit court declined to recognize the doc-
trine of apparent agency in a negligence action in Sanchez. Fi-
nally, though the Clements court swiftly dismissed all claims of
negligent hiring, the Padilla Court allowed the plaintiffs' claim of
negligent retention to go forward in overruling defendants' de-
murrers.
Lastly, in the area of unemployment compensation, Virginia
decisions largely conformed with the determinations of the Vir-
ginia Employment Commission, consistent with the highly defer-
ential standard of review such determinations are afforded. In
both Peck and Lindeman, the Court of Appeals of Virginia af-
firmed the Commission's award and denial, respectively, of bene-
fits. Lending further support for this contention, the court of ap-
peals reversed the trial court's holding in Hill, because the trial
court improperly ignored the Commission's findings of fact.
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